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Abstract 
We build an otherwise-standard business cycle model with housework, calibrated 
consistently with data on time use, in order to discipline consumption-hours 
complementarity and relate its strength to the size of fiscal multipliers. We show that if 
substitutability between home and market goods is calibrated on the empirically relevant 
range, consumption-hours complementarity is large and the model generates fiscal 
multipliers that agree with the evidence. Hence, our analysis supports the relevance of 
consumption-hours complementarity for fiscal multipliers. However, we also find that 
explicitly modeling the home sector is more appealing than restricting to the 
consumption-leisure margin and/or to the preferences proposed by Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Huffman (1988). A housework model can imply substantial 
complementarity, without low wealth effects contradicting the microeconomic evidence. 
JEL classification: E24, E32, E52, E62 
Bank classification: Fiscal policy; Business fluctuations and cycles 
Résumé 
Nous construisons un modèle de cycle économique standard auquel nous intégrons les 
travaux ménagers, et que nous étalonnons en fonction de données sur l’emploi du temps, 
afin d’assujettir aux données la complémentarité entre la consommation et les heures 
travaillées et d’établir le lien entre le degré de cette complémentarité et la taille des 
multiplicateurs budgétaires. Nous montrons que, si la substituabilité entre les produits 
maison et les produits marchands est étalonnée sur la fourchette de données pertinente du 
point de vue empirique, la complémentarité consommation-heures travaillées est 
importante et le modèle génère des multiplicateurs budgétaires qui concordent avec les 
données. Ainsi, l’importance de la complémentarité consommation-heures travaillées 
pour les multiplicateurs budgétaires est étayée par notre analyse. Par ailleurs, nous 
constatons également qu’il est plus avantageux de modéliser explicitement la production 
domestique que de s’en tenir à l’arbitrage consommation-loisirs ou aux préférences 
proposées par Greenwood, Hercowitz et Huffman (1988). Un modèle de travaux 
ménagers peut générer une complémentarité considérable, sans que de faibles effets de 
richesse viennent contredire les observations microéconomiques. 
Classification JEL : E24, E32, E52, E62 




The propagation of exogenous changes in public consumption to macroeconomic
variables is at the center of a controversial and ongoing debate. Standard theories
of the business cycle have had difficulty spanning the entire range of estimates
for fiscal multipliers, which vary considerably across studies, depending on the
assumptions used to identify fiscal shocks.1 Various theories have been proposed
to reconcile theoretical predictions with the evidence. Recent contributions, such
as Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Bilbiie (2011), Hall (2009a) and Monacelli
and Perotti (2008, 2010), have emphasized the importance of complementarity
between consumption and hours worked. Direct evidence on complementarity is
rather scant and its relevance is motivated by the observation that consumption
falls upon retirement, as in Aguiar and Hurst (2005). In this paper, we propose a
model of housework, calibrated consistently with evidence on time use, in order
to discipline consumption-hours complementarity and relate its strength to the
size of fiscal multipliers.
On top of the non-negligible size of the home sector, both in terms of time
and capital, as stressed, for example, in Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991),
our emphasis on home production is motivated by recent contributions pointing
to a great deal of substitutability between housework and market work. Aguiar
and Hurst (2007) have pointed out that substitutability between housework and
market work is important over the life cycle. At business cycle frequencies, home
production is estimated to absorb about 30 percent of foregone market work
(Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013)). Also, the literature on home pro-
duction has made available estimates about the substitutability between home
and market goods. Such estimates might be informative in assessing the quanti-
tative relevance of consumption-hours complementarity for fiscal multipliers.
We follow Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and we build an otherwise-
standard business cycle model with nominal price rigidities, where the household
can employ time and capital to produce a good that is non-tradable on the mar-
ket. We calibrate the model to match the size of the home sector in the United
States. Then, we map the elasticity of substitution between home and market
goods into a measure of complementarity as well as into fiscal multipliers of out-
put, hours worked and market consumption. We find that if substitutability
between home and market goods is calibrated on the empirically relevant range,
between 2 and 4, consumption-hours complementarity is large and the model
spans the whole range of estimates, agreeing with the evidence from vector au-
toregressions (VARs). In particular, for the midpoint value of substitutability,
the output multiplier is larger than 1, the consumption multiplier is mildly pos-
itive and it amounts to 0.13 percent.
Our analysis has interesting implications for the theoretical literature on fiscal
multipliers. To begin with, we find that evidence on home production supports
1See Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramey (2011), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Pappa (2009), Uhlig (2010), Perotti (2008), Caldara and Kamps (2012)
and Zubairy (2014) as a representative, though not exhaustive, sample of the empirical literature.
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the relevance of consumption-hours complementarity. However, our model of
housework delivers further insights. As Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1990,
1991) showed, for any utility function specified in a housework model, there
exists a reduced-form utility function that delivers the same market outcomes
in a model that abstracts from housework. Therefore, to the extent that some
evidence on home production is available, this class of models can be used to
discriminate among alternative theories that advocate particular preferences to
rationalize macroeconomic data. We compare our model with an alternative one
that assumes away home production and embeds preferences commonly used in
the literature: those proposed by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) (KPR) – the
most widely used in macroeconomics – and the ones proposed by Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) (GHH) – which have recently become increas-
ingly popular. A model with KPR preferences can generate fiscal multipliers
comparable with the ones in our model by assuming an elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution that is implausibly low. For example, to obtain a consumption
multiplier of 0.13 percent, one would need to calibrate the risk-aversion parame-
ter to 5. Since our model is closer to the microeconomic evidence than a model
with KPR preferences, our reduced-form preferences must be more general than
a KPR defined over market variables, even though we assume KPR preferences
in the “structural” model. We conclude that invoking substitutability between
market and home goods by explicitly modeling the home sector might be more
appealing than restricting to the consumption-leisure margin in a model with
KPR preferences. As far as GHH preferences are concerned, they can generate
substantial degrees of complementarity by ruling out wealth effects, which, how-
ever, seem to be sizeable, according to microeconomic evidence (Imbens, Rubin
and Sacerdote (2001)). We measure the strength of the wealth effect in our
model and we find that it is substantial. Hence, our analysis is less supportive
of theories building on GHH preferences: a housework model can imply empiri-
cally relevant degrees of complementarity, without assuming an implausibly low
wealth effect. In this respect, our findings are consistent with and support the
results by Eusepi and Preston (2009) and Furlanetto and Seneca (2014).
In our model, there are two key features that affect fiscal multipliers. First,
after a positive fiscal shock, aggregate demand is boosted, the price markup falls
because of nominal rigidity, labor demand shifts outward and the real wage in-
creases, ceteris paribus. Hence, at times when the government is spending, it is
particularly attractive to work on the market and consume market goods. Al-
though we focus on price stickiness, one could replace it with any alternative
theory that yields countercyclical markups, conditional on the fiscal shock. This
channel counteracts the negative wealth effect that depresses market consump-
tion and detains the expansion of aggregate economic activity. Second, the size
of the home sector and the substitutability between home and market goods af-
fect the incentive to reallocate resources to the market sector when government
consumption increases. Equivalently, if home and market goods are good substi-
tutes, market goods and hours worked on the market are complements. When
complementarity is strong enough, the outward shift of labor demand outbal-
3
ances the negative wealth effect, market consumption increases and the output
multiplier is larger than one.
Our paper relates to two large strands of macroeconomics. On the one hand,
the seminal contributions by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and Green-
wood and Hercowitz (1991) have spurred a rich literature. For instance, McGrat-
tan, Rogerson and Wright (1997) introduce housework in a real business cycle
model with fiscal policy. Campbell and Ludvigson (2001) further discuss the
implications of modeling home production in business cycle models. Canova and
Ubide (1998) and Karabarbounis (2014) show that home production is helpful in
addressing open-economy puzzles. Aruoba, Davis and Wright (2012) discuss the
relevance of housework for monetary policy. On the other hand, many theories
have been proposed to rationalize estimated fiscal multipliers. Gaĺı, López-Salido
and Vallés (2007) first modeled hand-to-mouth consumers to generate sizeable
demand effects, making consumption respond to current income. Corsetti, Meier
and Müller (2012) explain a positive private consumption response with spend-
ing reversals: current higher government expenditure implies permanently lower
future expenditure, so as to keep constant long-run government debt. Finally,
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) focus on deep habits. In this case, an
increase in domestic aggregate demand provides an incentive for firms to lower
markups shifting the labor demand curve outward, which is similar to our case
of sticky prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 its baseline parametrization. Section 4 computes impulse responses,
inspects the mechanism and, after summarizing the implications of our findings
for the literature, it performs extensive robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an otherwise-standard New Keynesian model, where households can
combine time and capital to produce non-tradable home goods. As in Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991) and McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997),2
households enjoy leisure and consumption of a composite index, which aggregates
market and home goods. The fiscal authority buys market goods and subsidizes
production so as to offset the steady-state distortion due to firms’ market power.
Expenditures are financed by levying lump-sum taxes.3 Finally, the central bank
is in charge of setting the nominal interest rate.
2Differently from Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), we allow households to substitute leisure with
time spent working either at home or on the market.
3In Appendix B, we show that our findings continue to hold in the case of distortionary taxation.
However, we always retain the assumption that distortionary taxes do not respond to transitory
government expenditure shocks, since we follow the empirical literature in focusing on deficit spending.
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2.1 Policy-makers
In the economy, there are infinitely many varieties of market goods indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. The fiscal authority buys each variety, Gt(i), at its market price, Pt(i).










where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties and log(Gt) exoge-
nously evolves according to a first-order autoregressive process, with mean equal
to log(G) and persistence ρg. We assume that the government chooses quantities
Gt(i) in order to minimize total expenditure,
∫ 1

















The central bank decides on the nominal interest rate by following a Taylor-type
rule:









Πt ≡ (Pt/Pt−1) and ỹt denote inflation and market production in deviation from
the flexible-price equilibrium, respectively. ρm, Φπ, Φy and Φdy are parameters
chosen by the monetary authority. Among others, this rule has been considered
by Smets and Wouters (2007).4
2.2 Households
Households can buy market goods, which can be either allocated to consumption,
Cm,t(i), or stored for investment purposes, It(i). We define aggregate market




















The evolution of capital over time is thus described by









4Due to the production subsidy, the flexible-price equilibrium is constrained efficient, thus the
monetary rule targets a welfare-relevant output gap. In Appendix C, we provide extensive robustness
analysis on the monetary rule.
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where δ ∈ (0, 1] and ξ > 0 stand for the depreciation rate and capital adjustment
costs, respectively. The existing capital stock can be rented to firms at price
rt or retained within the household for home production purposes. Let Km,t
be the capital stock available to firms and Kn,t the capital stock available for
non-market activity. Hence,
Kt = Km,t +Kn,t. (2.7)
The time endowment, which we normalize to 1, can be allocated to market work
in exchange for a real wage Wt or to housework, so that
1 = hm,t + hn,t + lt. (2.8)
hm,t and hn,t represent hours worked on the market and at home, respectively,
while lt is the residual time that can be enjoyed as leisure. We assume that
households are price-takers in all markets and that financial markets are com-
plete. Hence, the optimal allocation of expenditure across varieties i implies the
flow budget constraint
Et {Qt,t+1Bt+1} + Pt(Cm,t + It) ≤ Bt + WtPthm,t + rtPtKm,t + Tt. (2.9)
Bt+1 is a portfolio of state-contingent assets, Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount
factor for one-period-ahead nominal payoffs5 and Tt are all lump-sum taxes and
















b1 + (1− α1)(Cn,t)b1
] 1
b1 ; α1 ∈ [0, 1] and b1 < 1; (2.11)
Cn,t = (Kn,t)
α2 (hn,t)
1−α2 ; α2 ∈ [0, 1]. (2.12)
Home goods cannot be traded, but rather have to be produced within the house-
hold by combining capital and labor. According to our preference specification,
aggregate market and home goods can be substituted at a constant elasticity6
(1− b1)−1.
5The stochastic discount factor in period t is the price of a bond that delivers one unit of currency
if a given state of the world realizes in period t + 1, divided by the conditional probability that the
state of the world occurs given the information available in t. The nominal interest rate, Rt, relates
to the discount factor according to (1 +Rt) = {EtQt,t+1}−1 by a standard no-arbitrage argument.
6Recall the following limiting cases: when b1 approaches one, Cm,t and Cn,t are perfect substitutes.
They are instead perfect complements if b1 tends to minus infinity. b1 = 0 nests the Cobb-Douglas
specification. We restrict to a Cobb-Douglas home production technology. Appendix B shows that
our findings extend to the case of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function.
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Given initial values of the capital stock K0 and assets B0, and all prices and
policies, households maximize their lifetime utility by choosing state-contingent
sequences of market and home consumption, capital and hours worked, as well as
the total stock of capital and bonds to carry over to the next period. The solution



































Equation (2.13) drives the optimal allocation of time between the home and the
market sector. It establishes that the marginal rate of substitution between home
and market consumption has to equalize the corresponding relative price, which
is the ratio between the return to housework, i.e., the marginal productivity of
labor in the non-market sector, and the return to market work, i.e., the real
wage. Similarly, equation (2.14) requires that the marginal rate of substitution
between the two consumption goods is equal to the ratio of returns to capital
in the two sector, marginal productivity of capital at home and the rental rate
of market capital. Taken together, the two conditions imply that returns to
labor, relative to capital, are equalized across sectors. In fact, the household can
freely reallocate both time and capital between market and non-market activity.
Equation (2.15) is the standard intratemporal optimality condition solving for
the leisure-consumption trade-off. Finally, two conventional Euler equations are
required for the allocation to be optimal intertemporally, one for the capital stock



































where λ denotes the marginal utility of market consumption and reads as
λt = bα1(1− hn,t − hm,t)(1−b)(1−σ)Cb1−1m,t (Ct)b(1−σ)−b1 . (2.18)
2.3 Firms
In the economy, there are infinitely many monopolistically competitive firms, i ∈
[0, 1]. Each firm buys market capital and hours worked on perfectly competitive
7


















The real marginal cost, RMCt, is constant across firms because of constant
returns to scale in production and perfect competition on factor markets. We
follow Calvo (1983) and we assume that in any given period each firm resets its
price Pt(i) with a constant probability (1− θ). At a given price Pt(i), production






[Cm,t + It +Gt] . (2.22)
We assume that production is subsidized by the government, which pays a frac-





θjQt,t+j [Pt(i)Yt+j(i)− Pt+j(1− τ)RMCt+jYt+j(i)]
 (2.23)
subject to constraint (2.22) yields the following first-order condition for any firm












] = 0. (2.24)
P ∗t is the optimal price, Qt,t+j denotes the stochastic discount factor in period t









while Πt,t+j ≡ (Pt+j/Pt). Calvo pricing implies the following conventional rela-


















where the auxiliary variables x1,t and x2,t are recursively defined by




















2.4 Aggregation and Market Clearing











the clearing of the goods market implies
Yt = Cm,t + It +Gt. (2.31)
Define the market capital-labor ratio, kt ≡ (Km,t(i)) / (hm,t(i)). By equations

























and evolves according to






It is well known that log (∆t) is a second-order term and can thus be neglected
when the model is approximated to the first order around the non-stochastic







Km,t = kthm,t. (2.38)




















3 Parametrization of the Model
We resort to data in order to choose the values of structural parameters that
capture the importance of the home sector, relative to the market economy. In
particular, we calibrate these parameters in order to match the value of endoge-
nous variables at the non-stochastic steady state with their observable counter-
parts. We discipline the remaining parameters by using independent microeco-
nomic evidence as well as information coming from previous studies.7 After a
brief description of the data, this section illustrates the details of our calibration
strategy. Table 1 summarizes parameter values and the corresponding source
and/or calibration targets.
3.1 Data
We collect time series of capital, investment, market consumption, government
expenditure and the consumer price index (price index for personal consumption
expenditure) from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. All the series refer
to the time period 1950:Q1–2007:Q2, which excludes the financial crisis. Data
are available at a quarterly frequency, with the exception of capital, which is
annual. All series are seasonally adjusted. The series have been downloaded
in current dollars and divided by the consumer price index. The series of mar-
ket consumption includes non-durable goods and services, after subtracting the
value of services from housing and utilities that in turn are considered as part
of the non-market sector.8 Consistently, we assign fixed non-residential assets
to market capital, while we consider residential assets and the stock of durable
goods as part of the home capital. We obtain total investment by adding pur-
chases of durable goods to the fixed investment component, both residential and
non-residential, but we leave out inventories, as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
7In the exercises inspecting the transmission mechanism of fiscal shocks, we keep most of these
parameters fixed. However, we extensively check the robustness of our findings in Section 4.4.
8This is conventional in the home production literature. See, for instance, McGrattan, Rogerson
and Wright (1997).
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For government expenditure, we only include purchases of goods, while we omit
purchases of non-military durable goods and structures. We finally derive a
measure of GDP consistent with the model by summing up market consump-
tion, investment and government expenditure. We obtain average capital-output
ratios equal to 1.29 and 1.69 in the market and in the home sectors, respectively.
Government expenditure as a share of GDP amounts to 0.18.
We measure time use by relying on the information contained in the American
Time Use Survey (ATUS), as summarized by Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis
(2013). The ATUS provides nationally representative estimates of how Ameri-
cans spend their time, supplying data on a wide range of non-market activities,
from childcare to volunteering, for a cross-section of roughly 100, 000 individuals
over the period 2003–2010. Respondents are randomly selected from a subset of
households that have completed their eighth and final month of interviews for
the Current Population Survey (CPS). As a fraction of the weekly endowment,
time allocated to market work is 0.33, time for housework amounts to 0.19 and
the rest is devoted to leisure, which excludes sleeping, eating and personal-care
time.9
3.2 Baseline Calibration
We choose parameters β, ε, θ, ξ and σ by referring to independent microeconomic
evidence and/or previous studies. We set the discount factor β to 0.99, which
implies an annual interest rate of roughly 4 percent per year. The elasticity of
substitution between market varieties, ε = 11, matches a 10 percent steady-state
markup, while θ = 0.75 implies a conventional price duration of four quarters.
A production subsidy, τ = 1/ε, offsets the steady-state distortion due to monop-
olistic competition. As far as capital adjustment costs are concerned, estimates
display great variability, ranging from ξ = 3 to ξ = 110.10 We restrict to a value
in the middle range, ξ = 50. Parameter σ is determined so as to match an elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution equal to 0.5, a reasonable value for models
matching growth and/or fluctuations facts.11 Hence, we restrict to this case for
our main parametrization, while we check for robustness in the next section.
When inspecting the transmission mechanism of fiscal shocks, for the sake
of clarity we restrict to a simple monetary rule and we assume ρm = Φy =
Φdy = 0 and Φπ = 1.5. However, it is well known that the monetary response
significantly affects the impact of spending shocks on macroeconomic variables.12
9As reported by Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013) in Table B1 of their online Appendix,
the average respondent devotes 31.62 hours to market work and 18.12 hours to home production per
week. Our figures obtain after subtracting from the weekly time endowment sleeping, personal care
and eating, for a total of 72.92 hours. Instead, if those activities are included, market work and home
production time result in 0.18 and 0.11, respectively. Both ways of accounting time are used in the
home production literature. We choose the former in our baseline calibration, but our results are
robust to the latter definition.
10For a survey, see Neiss and Pappa (2002).
11See Hall (2009b) and Guvenen (2006) for an overview.
12For an illustration of the empirical importance of monetary accommodation after fiscal shocks,
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Hence, in Section 4.4, we conduct an extensive robustness analysis by considering
alternative parameter values. We also report the case of alternative classes of
rules in Appendix C.
Parameters α1, α2, α3, G, δ and b deserve particular attention. In fact, they
drive the size of the home sector, relative to the market economy. We recover
their values by using the model equilibrium conditions, evaluated at the non-
stochastic steady state, to target the average value of the following variables:
the ratio of investment to total capital stock; the capital-output ratio and hours
worked, both in the market and the home sector; and the share of government
expenditure in GDP. All variables without time subscript denote a steady state.
The steady-state version of the capital accumulation equation, (2.6), determines
the depreciation rate, δ, by using data on capital and investment. The Euler





Equations (2.26)-(2.29), together with the monetary rule (2.4), imply a unitary
real marginal cost at the steady state, while Π = P ∗/P = ∆ = 1 and (1 +R) =
β−1. Given the real interest rate and the target for the capital-output ratio in
the market sector, α3 is easily retrieved by equation (2.40). Therefore, given the
target on hm, one can easily solve for Y and Km via the production function










It follows from definitions (2.28) and (2.29) that x1 = x2 = (1 − βθ)Y , while
equation (2.41) determines the real wage:

















and α2 must be chosen such that the target on hours worked and the observed
capital-output ratio in the home sector are consistent. Knowing α2, Kn is also
pinned down and Cn can be found by using (2.12). Define g as the share of
















see for instance, Canova and Pappa (2011) and Bouakez and Eyquem (2012).
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where all endogenous variables have been determined. As a consequence, α1
must be chosen such that (3.5) holds. Finally, G = gY , while the labor supply
equation (2.15) recovers the value of b consistent with all our targets.
Even though parameters have been calibrated jointly, heuristically α1 and α2
match hours worked and the capital-output ratio in the home sector; b and α3
match hours worked and the capital-output ratio in the market sector; δ matches
the investment-capital ratio; and G implements a 0.18 share of government pur-
chases in GDP. The corresponding parameter values are reported in Table 1 and
are consistent with the home production literature. See, for instance, Aruoba,
Davis and Wright (2012).
We are finally left with the elasticity of substitution between market and home
goods, the parameter we are primarily interested in. In our baseline parametriza-
tion, we fix the elasticity to 4, which implies b1 = 0.75. However, in most of our
exercises, we leave the parameter free to vary, so as to assess its importance for
the transmission of G shocks. We finally take a stand on the magnitude of b1 in
Section 4.3, where we discuss the relevance of our findings for the literature on
fiscal multipliers.
4 Housework and Fiscal Multipliers
The purpose of this section is threefold. We first document that the size of the
home sector and the substitutability between market and home goods positively
affect the size of fiscal multipliers. Then, we investigate the transmission mecha-
nism of fiscal shocks by mapping values of the elasticity of substitution between
market and home goods into the degree of complementarity between market
goods and hours worked on the market. After summarizing the implications of
our findings for the literature, we conclude by performing extensive robustness
analysis following the methodology proposed by Canova and Paustian (2011).
4.1 Impulse Responses
We consider an exogenous increase in government expenditure, normalized to
one percentage point of steady-state GDP, and analyze its impact on market
consumption, hours worked on the market, real wages, GDP and investment. We
express the responses of hours worked and the real wage in terms of percentage
deviations from their steady state. We report GDP, market consumption and
investment in percentage points of GDP, so that their responses on impact can
be read as fiscal multipliers, and directly compared to the corresponding VAR
evidence. We maintain this normalization in the rest of the paper. All parameters
are as in Table 1. For the monetary rule, we assume ρm = Φy = Φdy = 0 and
Φπ = 1.5.
Figure 1 makes clear the contribution of home production by comparing
our model, labeled as “GHP,”with a counterfactual model, labeled as “Base-
line,”where hours worked and capital in the home sector are set to zero. It is
13
evident that the “GHP” model implies larger multipliers and, for b1 = 0.75, it
predicts a positive response of market consumption. In both models, a fiscal ex-
pansion conventionally generates a negative wealth effect: the shock reduces the
present discounted value of disposable income. Therefore, labor supply shifts out-
ward because it is optimal to work more, for any given wage. Since consumption
is a normal good, the wealth effect drives consumption down, ceteris paribus. On
the other hand, in both models, price stickiness boosts real wages, hours worked
and market consumption. The fiscal expansion stimulates aggregate demand, re-
duces price markups and consequently raises the real wage, making it relatively
more attractive to work in the market sector. The wealth and the aggregate
demand effects reinforce each other in increasing employment, but they push the
real wage and market consumption in opposite directions. The final outcome is
ultimately a quantitative question. In a model without home production, hours
worked on the market do not increase enough to prevent market consumption
from falling. The outcome is reversed when the household has the possibility of
reallocating time from housework to market activity.
Figure 2 shows that fiscal multipliers increase with the incentive to substitute
home and market goods, as long as prices are sticky. In fact, if we reduce the
elasticity of substitution or price stickiness, the output multiplier is dampened
and the response of market consumption turns to negative, as in the “Baseline”
version. When prices become more flexible, the outward shift of the labor supply
curve becomes more important, relative to the fall in markups, and the real wage
does not increase much or it even falls. In the latter case, the household falls back
on home consumption and spends on the market just as much time as needed to
optimally smooth the shock. Without an outward shift of labor demand, market
consumption is doomed to fall.13
4.2 Inspecting the Mechanism
We now turn our attention to why housework and the substitutability between
home and market goods amplify fiscal multipliers. We start by recalling the
equivalence result by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1990, 1991). Housework
does not add outcomes that would be impossible without it: for any given pref-
erences specified in the housework model, there exists a reduced-form utility
function that generates the same market equilibrium in a model without home
sector. Accordingly, inspecting our mechanism amounts to characterizing the
reduced-from preferences and relating their features to the transmission of fis-
cal shocks.14 The literature has pointed out that the major preference-related
drivers of fiscal multipliers are the elasticity of labor supply, the degree of com-
plementarity between market goods and hours worked on the market, and the
13Quoting Hall (2009a), “For the purpose of understanding fiscal policy, the issue is the markup,
not price stickiness itself.” Price stickiness might then be replaced with any alternative mechanism
that generates countercyclical markups, conditional on the shock.
14Such reduced-form preferences do not necessarily have a closed form, as in our case. However,
one can characterize their main properties as we do below.
14
strength of the wealth effect.15 Therefore, we map the size of the home sector
and values of the elasticity of substitution between market and home goods into













































and we evaluate them at the steady state. ηCm,W is the only measure that might
require some additional explanation. In the absence of complementarity between
consumption and hours worked on the market, ηCm,W must be zero: an increase
of the real wage positively affects labor supply, but it leaves market consumption
unaffected after controlling for higher labor income. In contrast, if consumption
and hours worked in the market sector are complements, they both increase
following a rise in the real wage, even if wealth is kept constant. Hence, ηCm,W
is positive and its magnitude measures the degree of complementarity.
Figure 3 compares the elasticities across the “GHP” and the “Baseline” ver-
sions of the model for different values of (1 − b1)−1. Both the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply and the degree of complementarity, ηhm,W and ηCm,W , increase
in the elasticity of substitution between home and market goods. Moreover, in
the “GHP,” they are larger than in the “Baseline” case. Intuitively, if home and
market goods are good substitutes, the household is more willing to reallocate
hours and consumption to the market sector when the return to market work
increases relative to the return to housework. The substitution margin between
consumption and leisure and the strength of the wealth effect are not affected
by housework, since ηl,W , ηl,λ and ηhm,λ do not vary with b1, nor with the size
of the home sector.17
As the labor supply elasticity and the degree of complementarity increase,
fiscal multipliers are amplified, because the household has a greater incentive to
substitute hours worked in the home sector with hours worked in the market
sector, conditional on a fiscal shock.18 Equivalently, the strength of the wealth
15See Hall (2009a), Bilbiie (2009, 2011) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008, 2010) for an extensive
discussion.
16Following Frisch (1959), we rewrite decision rules as functions of relative prices and the marginal
utility of market consumption, λ. Equations (4.1) emphasize that we fix either wealth or the real
wage, depending on whether we are interested in isolating income or substitution effects. Notice that
we define ηCm,λ as the opposite of the elasticity of market consumption to λ and thus it can be read
as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Appendix D provides details about the Frisch system.
17Consumption and leisure are normal goods; hence, the restrictions derived by Bilbiie (2009) are
satisfied in our model.
18An elastic labor supply makes the response of hours worked on the market larger, contributing to
larger output multipliers, while its effect on the response of the real wage and market consumption can
go either way, depending on parameter values. Following an outward shift of labor demand, a more
elastic labor supply dampens the rise of the real wage. However, it also dampens its fall when labor
15
effect, relative to the aggregate demand effect, is diminished because of the higher
elasticity of labor supply and consumption-hours complementarity in the market
sector.
Figure 4 repeats the previous exercise for σ = 1, showing that when util-
ity is separable in consumption and leisure, the transmission channel, though
weakened, is still active.
4.3 Implications of Our Findings for the Literature
The equivalence result, far from rendering home production irrelevant, allows us
to organize data in a useful way. If home production were excluded, reduced-
form preferences would have to be different in order to recover the observationally
equivalent model. As an implication, to the extent that microeconomic evidence
on preferences over home goods is available, home production models offer valu-
able guidance in specifying restrictions on the functional form and parameters of
the utility function in models that abstract from housework. By the same token,
this class of models can be used to discriminate among alternative theories that
advocate particular preferences to rationalize macroeconomic data. We apply
this logic to the literature on fiscal multipliers by taking a stand on b1 and on
the Frisch elasticities for which some evidence is available.
To have a broad idea of an empirically relevant range for the elasticity of
substitution, one can refer to a variety of micro- and macroeconomic studies.
The preferred calibration chosen by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) in
their seminal contribution about home production is 5. McGrattan, Rogerson
and Wright (1997) use macroeconomic data to estimate a version of the model by
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) via maximum likelihood and find a value
slightly below 2. In the same vein, Chang and Schorfheide (2003) use Bayesian
techniques and estimate an elasticity of about 2.3. Karabarbounis (2014) shows
that a value of 4 accounts for cyclical fluctuations of the labor wedge. Aguiar,
Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013) use data from the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS). After establishing that home production absorbs about 30 percent of
foregone market work hours at business cycle frequencies, they show that the
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) model is consistent with the ATUS ev-
idence under a 2.5 elasticity. One might consider 2.5 as a particularly relevant
case, since b1 has been chosen to match microeconomic evidence.
Our analysis delivers some key messages that are relevant to the literature
on fiscal multipliers. First, if one regards the [2, 4] interval as an empirically
relevant range for the substitutability between market and home goods, a model
of housework delivers fiscal multipliers that agree with the VAR evidence. For
the middle-range value of substitutability, the consumption multiplier is mildly
positive and amounts to 0.13 percent, while the output multiplier is greater than
1. The implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ηhm,W , is fairly high and about
supply shifts outwards. Since both demand and supply shift, the net effect on market consumption is
a quantitative issue.
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1.8, but it is consistent with the value advocated by Hall (2009b), accounting for
both the intensive and the extensive margins of employment.
Second, evidence on time use supports the plausibility of substantial com-
plementarity between consumption and hours worked in the market sector, as
proposed by Bilbiie (2011). For (1 − b1)−1 = 3, the implied degree of comple-
mentarity is indeed about 1.2 percent. However, we also differ from previous
contributions, since we rationalize complementarity by invoking substitutabil-
ity of market consumption along both the leisure and the home-consumption
margins. Explicitly modeling housework has the advantage of generating high
complementarity and a weak wealth effect, relative to the substitution induced
by higher wages, without imposing an implausibly low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. For example, if we were to calibrate the “Baseline” model in order
to obtain a consumption multiplier of 0.13 percent, we would need to assume
σ = 5.
More broadly, our analysis suggests that if one abstracts from housework,
KPR preferences might be too restrictive. Even though we assume KPR prefer-
ences in our “structural” model, the corresponding reduced-form utility function
must impose restrictions on Frisch elasticities that are weaker than the ones em-
bedded in a KPR preference specification defined on market consumption and
leisure. In fact, in the same model, we can match multipliers with a calibra-
tion that is fairly in line with microeconomic evidence, while a KPR preference
specification that abstracts from housework cannot. Since the reduced-form util-
ity function cannot be derived in closed form, a model of housework and KPR
preferences might be an attractive option.
Also, our exercise is less supportive of theories relying on preferences that rule
out sizeable wealth effects, such as Monacelli and Perotti (2008, 2010), Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). If housework
is explicitly modeled, or equivalently, if one is willing to assume more general
preferences than the ones introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman
(1988), empirically plausible degrees of complementarity can be achieved without
assuming away wealth effects. We believe that this is a reassuring implication of
our analysis in the light of microeconomic studies that emphasize the relevance
of non-negligible wealth effects.19 In this respect, our findings are consistent and
support the results by Eusepi and Preston (2009) and Furlanetto and Seneca
(2014).
Last but not least, strong complementarity can be useful to complement
alternative mechanisms that contribute to rationalize estimated multipliers, but
that might require a questionable parametrization if used in isolation. Canova
and Paustian (2011) argue that models relying on hand-to-mouth consumers,
such as Gaĺı, López-Salido and Vallés (2007), need a fraction of non-Ricardian
households that is implausibly high. The inclusion of housework could be helpful.
19See Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001).
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4.4 Robustness
The parametrization of the model may hide some forces that under- or overstate
the quantitative importance of substitutability between market and home goods.
In addition to price stickiness and b1, several parameters are naturally expected
to be relevant. As already emphasized by Basu and Kimball (2002), risk aversion,
σ, affects both the strength of the wealth effect and complementarity between
consumption and leisure. A large cost of adjustment of the capital stock, ξ,
discourages households from smoothing the fiscal shock by reducing savings and
investment. The monetary reaction to the shock also plays an important role, as
pointed out above. Finally, the persistence of government expenditure shocks,
ρg, makes the wealth effect stronger, thus magnifying the incentive to reduce
market consumption on impact.
As in Canova and Paustian (2011), we perform the following robustness exer-
cise. We consider 50,000 draws of parameters from uniform distributions defined
over an empirically relevant range. In particular, we consider the following pa-
rameters with their respective bounds: θ ∈ [0.2, 0.9], σ ∈ [1, 4], ξ ∈ [3, 110], ρm ∈
[0, 0.9], Φπ ∈ [1.05, 2.5], Φy ∈ [0.05, 0.25], Φdy ∈ [0.15, 0.30] and ρg ∈ [0, 0.95].
For convenience, we collect and report these values in Table 2. The 50,000 draws
generate a distribution of the impulse response function of market consumption
to government expenditure shocks. Figure 5 reports the percentage of positive re-
sponses on impact (left panel) and the median responses on impact (right panel),
as functions of the elasticity of substitution between home and market goods. We
display the results for a given value of the price-stickiness parameter and for the
case where θ is also randomly drawn from the uniform distribution. The median
response of market consumption confirms the relation we find in Figure 2. It also
shows that, for a plausible degree of complementarity and a sensible calibration
of the other structural parameters, our model likely predicts a mildly positive
response of market consumption.
5 Conclusion
We build an otherwise-standard New Keynesian model that encompasses a home
production sector. Following the seminal intuition by Benhabib, Rogerson and
Wright (1991), we use the housework model, together with evidence on time use
and substitutability between home and market goods, to assess the importance
of consumption-hours complementarity for fiscal multipliers. We find that the
home-market consumption margin is relevant to generate complementarity, which
is large enough to yield fiscal multipliers in line with the macroeconomic evidence.
We also find that explicitly modeling the home sector is more appealing than
restricting to the consumption-leisure margin with KPR preferences. Moreover,
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Figure 1: Impulse responses for the model calibrated as in Table 1, labeled as GHP,


























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Frisch elasticities across the GHP and the Baseline versions of the model, for
different values of (1− b1)−1. All remaining parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.









































Figure 4: Frisch elasticities across the GHP and the Baseline versions of the model, for
different values of (1 − b1)−1, and σ = 1. All remaining parameters are calibrated as
in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Percentage of positive consumption multipliers (left-hand panel) and median
responses (right-hand panel) to a G shock for 50, 000 draws from uniform distributions
of the following parameters, with their respective bounds, as summarized in Table 2:
θ ∈ [0.2, 0.9], σ ∈ [1, 4], ξ ∈ [3, 110], ρm ∈ [0, 0.9], Φπ ∈ [1.05, 2.5], Φy ∈ [0.05, 0.25],
Φdy ∈ [0.15, 0.30], ρg ∈ [0, 0.95]. All the other parameters are chosen as in Table 1.
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Mnemonic Value Target/Source
β 0.99 4% average real return
ε 11 10% price markup
θ 3/4 price duration
ξ 50 Neiss and Pappa (2002)
σ 2 intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.5
ρg 0.8 Monacelli and Perotti (2008, 2010)
α1 0.5199 Km/Y = 1.29
α2 0.0950 hm = 0.33
b 0.4938 Kn/Y = 1.69
α3 0.0441 hn = 0.19
δ 0.0241 I/K = 0.0241
G 0.0601 G/Y = 0.18
b1 0.75 4% elasticity of substitution between Cm and Cn
Table 1: Baseline calibration
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Parameter Description Support
θ price stickiness [0.2, 0.9]
σ risk aversion [1, 4]
ξ capital adjustment cost [3, 110]
ρg AR(1) parameter government spending [0, 0.95]
ρm interest rate smoother [0, 0.9]
Φπ policy response to inflation [1.05, 2.5]
Φy policy response to output gap [0.05, 0.25]
Φdy policy response to growth in output gap [0.15, 0.30]
ΦY policy response to output (Appendix D) [0, 0.1]
Table 2: Support for the structural parameters used in the simulations in Section 4.4
and in Appendix C
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A Equilibrium Definition
The equilibrium of the model is a set of state-contingent plans for variables Ct,
Cm,t, Cn,t, Km,t, Kn,t, Kt, hm,t, hn,t, It, λt, Yt, Πt, ∆t,
P ∗t
Pt
, x1,t, x2,t, RMCt, Rt,










Kt = Km,t +Kn,t (A.3)











































































































































(1 +Rt) = β
−1ΠΦπt (A.20)
for all t, for given tax rates and government expenditure. To close the equilibrium
definition, we furthermore need a specification for monetary policy and a law of
motion for government expenditure.
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B Robustness: Distortionary Taxation and
CES Production Functions
In this section, we show that our findings continue to hold in the case of distor-
tionary taxation on capital and labor, and in the more general case of constant











b3 + (1− α3) (hm,t)b3
] 1
b3 , (B.2)
where (B.1) and (B.2) replace equations (2.12) and (2.19), respectively. Assuming
the presence of distortionary taxes on capital and labor, the household’s budget
constraint, (2.9), becomes
Et {Qt,t+1Bt+1}+ Pt(Cm,t + It)
≤ Bt + (1− τh)WtPthm,t + (1− τk)rtPtKm,t + δτkPtKm,t + Tt. (B.3)
Accordingly, the household’s intratemporal conditions, (2.13) - (2.15), and the
Euler equation for the optimal intertemporal allocation of the capital stock,










































































[exp{sm,t}]b3 = Wt. (B.9)
All remaining equilibrium conditions remain unaffected. We set tax rates accord-
ing to the base case in McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997), i.e., τk = 0.55
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and τh = 0.24, and set b2 = 0.269 and b3 = 0.054 according to the estimates
in McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997). Figure B.1 shows that the rela-
tive performance of our model, labeled as “GHP,”compared to a counterfactual
model, labeled as “Baseline,”where hours worked and capital in the home sector
are set to zero, is unaffected by the presence of distortionary taxes and by the














































Figure B.1: Impulse responses with distortionary taxation, τk = 0.55 and τh = 0.24,
and CES production functions both in the market (b2 = 0.269) and the home sector
(b3 = 0.054). All the other parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
33
C Robustness: Monetary Policy Rules
In this section, we assess the robustness of our findings to two additional mon-
etary policy rules for which we repeat the exercise presented in Section 4.4,
following Canova and Paustian (2011). In particular, we consider the following
monetary policy rules.
• Taylor Rule with Output (in deviation from steady state) and
Interest Rate Smoother (Rule 1):









Among others, this rule has been considered by Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2004), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2005), Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets
and Wouters (2007), and Canova and Paustian (2011).
• Simple Taylor Rule with Interest Rate Smoother (Rule 2):






We take 50, 000 draws from uniform distributions of the following parameters,
with their respective bounds: θ ∈ [0.2, 0.9], σ ∈ [1, 4], ξ ∈ [3, 110], ρm ∈ [0, 0.9],
Φπ ∈ [1.05, 2.5], ρg ∈ [0, 0.95] and ΦY ∈ [0, 0.1] for Rule 1. Supports for the struc-
tural parameters used in the simulations are summarized in Table 2. All the other
parameters are chosen as in Table 1. As it becomes clear from Figure C.1, the
two monetary policy rules do not differ significantly from our main specification,
neither in terms of the percentage of positive consumption multipliers, nor in
terms of the median responses of market consumption to government expendi-
ture shocks. However, notice that we choose to be conservative and report the


















































































































































































































































































































































Following Frisch (1959), we define the Frisch system of our model. Given the
utility function, (2.10), and the budget constraint, (2.9), the choice variables are
yt = {Ct, Cm,t, Cn,t, hm,t, hn,t, kn,t}, whereas xt = {λt,Wt, rt} are taken as given.
Six equations define the Frisch system:
bα1(1− hn,t − hm,t)(1−b)(1−σ)Cb1−1m,t C
b(1−σ)−b1
t − λt = f1 (D.1)
(1− b)Cb(1−σ)t (1− hn,t − hm,t)(1−b)(1−σ)−1 − λtWt = f2 (D.2)
(1− hn,t − hm,t)b(1− α1)(1− α2)
cb1n,t
hn,t
− (1− b)Cb1t = f3 (D.3)







n,t = f4 (D.4)[
α1(Cm,t)
b1 + (1− α1)(Cn,t)b1
] 1
b1 − Ct = f5 (D.5)
(Kn,t)
α2 (hn,t)
1−α2 − Cn,t = f6 (D.6)


















































where Jy is the Jacobian matrix of function f with respect to the control vari-
ables, Jx is the Jacobian matrix of function f with respect to the state variables.
36
